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Abstract.  This paper presents axiomatic characterizations of two bankruptcy rules 
discussed in Jewish legal literature: the Constrained Equal Awards rule and the 
Contested Garment principle (the latter is defined only for two-creditor problems.) 
A major property in these characterizations is independence of irrelevant claims, 
which requires that if an individual claim exceeds the total to be allocated the 
excess claim should be considered irrelevant. 
1.  Introduction 
The bankruptcy problem deals with the problem of how to divide an estate among 
all  creditors when  the  estate is  insufficient to  meet the deceased's  debts.  This 
problem was addressed by Jewish scholars at least since the era of the collation of 
the Talmud. Various allocations rules  were  proposed, some supported by legal 
reasoning. Two of the best known rules are the Constrained Equal Awards (CEA) 
rule and the Contested Garment (CG) principle. The first divides the estate equally 
among the creditors provided that no one gets more than his claim. This rule was 
accepted as law by most important rabbinical authorities. The Contested Garment 
principle,  which is defined only for two-creditor problems, gives each creditor the 
part of the estate conceded to him by the other creditor, and divides the remaining 
contested amount equally  1. 
O'Neill (1982) suggested that the bankruptcy problem could be analyzed by 
game-theoretic methods. He proposed a formal presentation of the problem and 
gave an axiomatic treatment of rules that appear in rabbinical sources. In addition 
he proposed a TU game that represents the bankruptcy problem. By applying the 
The author gratefully acknowledges helpful conversations with Oscar Volij. 
1  The Contested Garment principle was recommended  for situations which are considered 
distinct from the  bankruptcy  problem presented here, and  therefore the fact that the 
two-creditor CEA rule is different  from this principle does not constitute a contradiction in 
Jewish law. 52  N. Dagan 
Shapley value to  this  game,  O'Neill  generated a  rule that generalizes  the  CG 
principle to any n-creditor bankruptcy problem. Aumann and Maschler (1985) 
applied the nucleolus to  the TU game mentioned above and generated a  new 
bankruptcy rule.  They showed that their rule recommends the same allocations 
recommended by  Rabbi  Nathan  some  two  thousand  years  ago  to  the  three 
particular cases  he considered. Moreover, they argued that it is most likely that 
Rabbi Nathan had in mind the rule induced by nucleolus. Aumann and Maschler 
support this conjecture by showing that their rule is closely related to two other 
rules discussed in Jewish legal literature: the Contested Garment principle and the 
Constrained Equal Awards rule. 
In this paper we provide axiomatic characterizations of the latter two rules. 
A property common to both these rules is that any individual claim that exceeds 
the total to be allocated is considered irrelevant. We claim that this property and 
other  properties  used  in  the  characterizations are  inspired  by  legal  principles 
mentioned in the Talmudic literature. 
Since the rule suggested by Aumann and Maschler (1985) can be characterized by 
combining the CG principle with a consistency requirement,  our characterizations of 
the CG principle  induce characterizations of Aumann and Maschler's  rule as well. 
In the next section we present the basic problem that appears in the Talmud. In 
Section 3 we present the formal model. An axiomatic characterization of the CEA 
rule is  derived in  Section 4.  Then we study the CG principle and present two 
axiomatic characterizations of this rule (Section  5). Section 6 concludes. 
2.  The basic problem 
In the Talmud (Ketuboth, 93a) the following problem is considered: A man died 
and left three widows whose claims on the deceased's estate are one hundred, two 
hundred, and three hundred, respectively. Unfortunately. the estate is less than six 
hundred. Rabbi Nathan considered three cases: in one the estate is a hundred, in 
the second the estate is two hundred, and in the third it is three hundred. The 
divisions he proposed are summarized in Table 1 below. 
Table 1 
Claims 
Estate  100  200  300 
100  33½  33~  33½ 
200  50  75  75 
3O0  50  100  150 
Rabbi Nathan did not explain the general principle underlying these recom- 
mendations. This led to many discussions,  some trying to explain Rabbi Nathan's 
recommendations and some proposing other rules. 
3.  The formal model 
A bankruptcy problem is a pair (E,c) where c =  (cb ... ,cn) _> 0, and 0 _< E < Z~= 1 
cg. E represents the total value of the estate and c is the vector of the creditors' Old bankruptcy rules  53 
claims. The sum of these claims is denoted by C. An allocation in such a problem is 
an  n-tuple  x=(xb  ... ,x,)  ER"  with  Y,~_lxi=E  and  O<x~<_ci,  i= 1, ... ,n. 
A rule is a function that assigns a unique allocation to each bankruptcy problem. 
We denote the set of all creditors by N. 
4.  The Constrained Equal Awards rule 
We begin with a comment of a scholar called Rabbi z. He said "I do not approve of 
Rabbi Nathan's  views in these  [-cases]  for [the three wives]  take equal shares." 
Rashi a claimed that  Rabbi  suggested the Constrained Equal Awards (CEA)  rule 
which is defined as follows: CEA (E, c) =  x, where x; =  rain {2, ci } and 2 solves the 
equation ZiEN min {2,ci} =  E <s. 
The CEA rule was accepted as law by most important rabbinical authorities 
including Maimonides 6. 
Now we present and discuss the properties that characterize CEA rule: 
Independence  of irrelevant  claims:  A  rule f  satisfies  independence  of irrelevant 
claims,  if for  all  bankruptcy problems  (E,e), f(E,c) =f(E, ee),  where  c~ =  min 
{ci, E}  and e  E =  (c~, ..., c,~). 
The major argument in favor of this property is that one cannot claim more 
than there is;  thus the excess of a  claim above the estate is irrelevant. A  rule is 
independent of irrelevant claims if it allocates the estate taking into account only 
the relevant claims. 
Rasag v  in  explaining  Rabbi  Nathan's  recommendations  (recall  Table  1  in 
Section 2),  says:  "...  every widow that  the  estate is  less  than  her  claim is  not 
preferred relative to the  one that precedes her ...  Therefore, when the estate is 
a  hundred, that is less than the claims of the second and the third, they are not 
preferred relative to the first, and thus all three split equally; and when the estate is 
two hundred  ...  the third is not preferred relative to the second, but each takes 
seventy-five." 
An  indirect evidence that  the principle of independence of irrelevant claims 
was  widely  accepted  is  the  fact  that  almost  no  one  in  Jewish  rabbinical  lore 
expressed any objection, or provided a lengthy explanation, to the division recom- 
mended  by  Rabbi  Nathan  to  the  case  of an  estate of a  hundred.  It  is  clear 
that  the  CEA  rule  satisfies  independence  of irrelevant claims  as  for all  2 _< E, 
min{2, e,} =  min {2,c~}. 
Now, we turn to another property satisfied by the CEA rule. 
2 It appears in Ketuboth 93a, see the English translation of the Babylonian Talmud edited 
by Epstein (1936, Vol. 2, p. 592). 
3 Rabbi Shelomo Yitshaki (1040-1105). His interpretation may be found in most editions of 
the Talmud, e.g., Steinsaltz  (1985). 
4 This equation has a unique solution when C > E. If C = E, any solution 2 is greater than 
or equal to the maximum claim and therefore xi = ci for all i. 
5 Some others interpreted Rabbi's rule as the proportional rule. 
6 Rabbi Moshe ben Maimon (1138-1204), quoted in Levine (1939, Vol. 8, p. 311). 
7 Rabbi Seadiya Gaon (882-942), quoted in Levine (1939, Vol. 8, p. 310). The translation to 
English is my own. 54  N. Dagan 
Composition:  A  rule f  satisfies composition if for all bankruptcy problems (E,e), 
and for all 0 < E' <_ E,f(E',e) =  x  implies f(E,e) =  x  +f(E -  E',e -  x). 
A rule satisfies composition if it permits division of part of the estate, and then 
division of the reminder with respect to the outstanding claims. 
The idea that the estate may be divided in steps can be found in Rabina, 8 who 
claimed that  Rabbi  Nathan's  recommendations in the cases of 200 and  300 are 
a  result of two-stage division. Rashi, interpreting Rabina, proposed a  rule which 
does not satisfy composition  9. By choosing E' =  75, and applying this rule in steps 
one gets the divisions recommended by Rabbi Nathan. Clearly, if the courts apply 
two-step  divisions,  as  Rashi  assumed,  the  composition  property  of rules  is  of 
interest. 
Composition appears  also in Young's (1988, Theorem  1) characterization of 
equal sacrifice taxation methods. 
The next axiom is a natural symmetry requirement. 
Equal treatment:  A rule satisfies equal treatment if it always assigns equal awards 
to creditors with equal claims. 
It turns out that the above three axioms characterize the CEA rule. Formally: 
Proposition  1.  The  CEA  rule  is  the  unique  rule  that  satisfies  independence  of 
irrelevant claims, composition, and equal treatment. 
Proof  We will prove only the uniqueness part. 
Note that if a rule satisfies composition it is monotone in the sense that if the 
estate becomes larger, no creditor is worse off. 
Let (E,c) be  a  bankruptcy problem.  Assume  without loss  of generality that 
creditors are indexed by the order of their claims, i.e., 0 <  ca <  c2 _<  ...  <  c,. 
Now, letf be a rule that satisfies independence of irrelevant claims, composi- 
tion, and equal treatment. Consider the case in which E  <  ca: =  EI. By indepen- 
dence of irrelevant claims  and  equal  treatment  the  estate is  split  equally,  thus 
f(E,c) =  CEA(E,c). Now consider the case in which E  <  cl +  cl (1 -  l/n): =  E  2. 
By  composition  and  the  previous  step f(E,e)=  x +f(E--El,  e--x),  where 
x  =  CEA(EI, e).  Note  that  E--E1  < c1(1-  1/n)= cl-xl.  Thus,  by  indepen- 
dence of irrelevant claims and equal treatment the amount E -  E1 is split equally 
thus f(E -  El, e -  x) =  CEA(E -- El, e -- x),  and f(E,e) =  CEA(E,e).  Now,  we 
can  repeat  the  same  argument  finitely  many  times  and  show  that 
f(E,c) =  CEA(E,c) for all E  <  ncl. By the monotonicity off this holds also for 
E = ncx.  Now  the  whole  argument  may  be  applied  to  show  that 
f(E,c) =  CEA(E,e) for all E  <  ncl + (n  -  1)(c2  --  el).  This may be repeated until 
all possible estates are covered.  Q.E.D. 
5.  The Contested Garment principle 
In this section we discuss a  problem whose relation to the bankruptcy problem, 
presented in Sect. 2, will become clear towards the end of the section. 
8 See the Gemara of Ketuboth 93a, Epstein (1936, Vol. 2, p. 591). 
9 More references  concerning this  rule may be found in  Aumann and Maschler  (1985, 
Sect. 4 and footnote 14). Old bankruptcy rules  55 
Various Talmudic studies discussed by Aumann and Maschler (1985), consider 
an idea of duality of rules. A dual of a rulef is the rule that assigns awards in the 
same manner asf assigns losses. Letf be a rule. The dual off is the rule that assigns 
each  bankruptcy  problem  (E,e)  the  allocation  e-f(C-  E,e) 1°.  Some  division 
problems (not necessarily bankruptcy problems) have a  natural interpretation of 
division of awards, and some division problems have a  natural interpretation of 
division of losses. Now, it may be desired that rules applied to various problems be 
compatible in the sense that if a  rule is used in the division of awards, its dual 
should be  used  in  the  division  of losses.  If one  considers  both  interpretations 
natural in bankruptcy problems and accepts the above idea, then one must require 
bankruptcy rules to coincide with their duals. Formally we define: 
Self-duality:  A rule f  is a  self-dual if for all bankruptcy problems (E, e), f(E, e) = 
e -f(C  -  E, c). 
A self-dual rule allocates awards and losses in the same manner. The CEA is 
clearly not self-dual. Are there any rules that are both self-dual and independent of 
irrelevant claims? The answer is yes. Indeed, the rule O'Neill (1982) generated from 
the Shapley value, Aumann and Maschler's (1985) Contested Garment Consistent 
rule,  and  the  Adjusted  Proportional  rule introduced by Curiel et  al. (1988)  all 
satisfy these two properties. In two-creditor problems these three rules coincide 
with a Talmudic rule known as the Contested  Garment (CG) principle, defined as 
follows  11: 
I  E  E+  E  cf] 
CG(E,(ci,cj))  =  E  +  c~ -  cj  cj  - 
2  '  2  " 
In  turns  out, that when confined to  two-creditor problems,  self-duality and 
independence of irrelevant claims characterize the CG principle.  This is  stated 
formally as follows: 
Proposition 2.  The Contested Garment principle is the unique two-creditor rule that 
satisfies  self-duality  and independence  of irrelevant  claims. 
Proof  We will prove  only the uniqueness part.  Let (E,(ci, cj))  be  a  bankruptcy 
problem,  and let f  be  a  self-dual and an independent of irrelevant claims rule. 
Without loss of generality, there are three cases:  (a)  ci < E  < c j, (b)  E  <  ci <  % 
and (c)  ci <  cj <  E. 
Case (a)  ci <_ E  <__ cj. Let c) =  2E -  ci. Note that c) >  E. Consider the bankruptcy 
problem (E, (ci, c))). By independence of irrelevant claims. 
f(E, (cl, c  j)) = f(E, (ci, E)) = f(E, (ci, c))).  (1) 
Further note that, ci +  c) -  E =  E. Thus, by self-duality, 
f,. (e. (c. c))) =  c, -f,  (E. (c. c)))  (2) 
10 Recall that C is the sum of the claims. 
11 This  definition  is  equivalent  to  Aumann and  Maschler's  (1985), and generalizes the 
Tahnudic principle which is not defined for all two-creditor problems. 56  N. Dagan 
or 
f, (e, (c,, c;) ) =  c,/2.  (3) 
(1) and (3) imply 
fi (E, (ci, c j)) =  ci/2. 
This concludes the proof for case (a). 
Case  (b)  E  <  ci < cj.  By  independence  of  irrelevant  claims,  f(E, ei, c  j)) = 
f(E,(E,E)).  Since  E  <  E  <E,  (E,(E,E))  belongs  to  case  (a),  which  is  already 
solved, thus the proof for case (b) is completed. 
Case  (c)  ci < c I < E.  By  self-duality,  f(E,(c~,cj)) = c -f(C  -  E,(ci, cj)).  Note 
that  (C-  E,(c~, ci) )  is  in  case  (b),  which  is  already  solved.  This  concludes  the 
proof.  Q.E.D. 
Although the axioms in Proposition 2 are inspired by Talmudic principles, the 
rationale  given  for  this  rule  is  quite  different.  The  contested  garment  problem 
appears in the Talmud (Baba Mezia,  2a). The problem is as follows: Two people 
contest ownership of a garment, both claiming that it is partly (or entirely) theirs. 
The parts  they claim total more than  one. This problem is similar  to the bank- 
ruptcy problem  but  differs  from  it  in  two  respects.  One is  that  in  the  garment 
problem it impossible for both claims to be true, but if we assume that both claims 
are identically credible this difference may be ignored. Another difference is that in 
the garment problem no one can claim more than the whole garment by definition, 
whereas in the bankruptcy problem this is possible. As the Talmudic CG principle 
is described for a case in which no one claims more than the whole, the definition 
given  above generalizes  the  principle  to  all  two-creditor  problems  by assuming 
independence of irrelevant claims. Rashi explained the CG principle by considering 
the case of one person claiming the whole and the other claiming half, upon which 
the one who claims half agrees that the other half belongs to the other claimant. 
Thus, the one who claims the whole is to receive the latter half. The first half, which 
is claimed by both, is divided equally.  Rashi's explanation  inspires  the following 
formal discussion:  For each (n-creditor) bankruptcy problem (E, e) and creditor i, 
define 
t 
vl  E'c)  is  the  amount  of  money  conceded  to  creditor  i  by  all  other  creditors. 
Whenever  there  is  no  danger  of confusion  we write  vi  instead  of viE'c(  In  any 
allocation  x  v~ _< xi,  which  means  that  v~ is  the  minimum  amount  that  can  be 
assigned to  i by any rule 12. The fact that  any allocation  assigns  each player an 
amount  greater than  v~ allows us to interpret  v~ as the maximum  amount which 
everybody agrees is due to creditor i. No matter how the estate is divided among 
the creditors,  there is complete agreement  that  each will receive at least vi. This 
leads to the following property: 
v-Separability:  A rule f  is v-separable if for all bankruptcy problems (E, c), 
f(E,c)=v+f(E-  ~  vi, 
where v =  (Vl .....  vn). Old bankruptcy  rules  57 
v-separability says that the problem can be solved in two steps: First give each 
creditor  the  amount  conceded  by  the  others  and  then  apply  the  rule  to  the 
bankruptcy problem where the debts are reduced by v and the value of the assets is 
what remains after the first step. 
It  can  be  easily  verified  that  (E-~i~Nvi,  c-v)  is  indeed  a  bankruptcy 
problem 12. 
Now, let us return to the two-person garment problem. It is easily verified that 
when the maximum claim does not exceed the whole garment then in the second 
stage (E-  Zi~NVi, C- V), both creditors claim the whole, thus an equal split is 
sensible. In the general case both creditors claim at least the whole in this second 
stage, making  the problem symmetric, if we accept the axiom  of independence 
of irrelevant  claims.  This  leads  to  the  conclusion  that  creditor  i  should  get 
vi + (E -  vi -  @/2. The reader is invited to check that this formula is equivalent to 
the one in the definition of the CG principle. 
The above discussion leads to another characterization  of the CG principle: 
Proposition 3.  The CG principle is the unique two-creditor rule that satisfies v -  sep- 
arability, independence  of irrelevant  claims and equal treatment. 
The proof follows directly from the discussion that precedes the Proposition, 
and is therefore left to the reader. 
Are the axioms used in Propositions 2 and 3 interdependent in the n-creditor 
case? The answer is that independence of irrelevant claims and self-duality imply 
v-separability, but do not imply equal treatment. The axioms of Proposition 3 do 
not impty self-duality. Formally: 
Proposition 4.  (a)  Ira rule is both independent of irrelevant claims and self-dual, then 
it is v-separable. 
(b)  There  exists  a  rule  that  satisfies  independence  of irrelevant  claims  and  self- 
duality, and does not satisfy equal treatment. 
(c)  There exists a rule that satisfies v-separability,  independence  of irrelevant claims, 
and equal treatment, and is not self-dual. 
Proof  (a)  Let f  be self-dual and independent of irrelevant claims. By self-duality, 
for all  bankruptcy problems (E, c), f(E, c) -- c -f(C  -  E, c). By independence  of 
irrelevant  claims,  c-f(C-  E,c)= c-f(C-  E, cC-E).  By applying  self-duality 
again, we receive 
e-f(C-E'eC-E)--c--{eC-~--fI(  Y"cC-e(C-E))'eC-nl}'t_\~N  (4, 
Now, note that 
c~-cC-e=c~-min{ci, C-E}=max{O,E-C+ci}=v~  for all i.  (5) 
Substituting (5) in (4) gives the required result. 
(b)  Consider the rule that assigns each bankruptcy problem (E,e) with the set of 
creditors  N--  {1,2,3}  the  allocation  x,  where  xl =  CGI[E,(cl, c2 + c3)]  and 
(x2, x3) =  CG[E -  xl, (cz, ca)]. This rule is self-dual and independent of irrelevant 
claims, but does not satisfy a  symmetry property, weaker than  equal treatment, 
12 A proof of this statement is given in Dagan and Volij (1993). 58  N. Dagan 
that requires that if all creditors have equal claims they split the estate equally. For 
example,  in  the  problem  (100.(100,100,100))  the  recommended  allocation  is 
(50,25,25). 
(c)  Consider the rule f  that is defined as follows: f(E, c) =  v +  CEA(E -  ~i~uvi, 
c-  v).  Q.E.D. 
It is clear that the CG principle does not satisfy composition. Does a self-dual 
rule that  satisfies composition exist?  Young (1988, Theorem  3) showed that  the 
proportional rule is the unique rule that satisfies  these two properties. 
For the sake of completeness, we briefly discuss results concerning the analysis 
of Rabbi Nathan's puzzling recommendations. Pineles (1861, p. 64) discovered that 
Rabbi Nathan's recommendations coincide with the recommendations of the CEA 
with respect to half the claims i.e., with CEA (E, c/2). He completed the rule for the 
case where the estate exceeds half of the sum of the claims. His rule does not satisfy 
independence  of irrelevant  claims  or self-duality. Aumann  and  Maschler (1985) 
proposed a rule which is the unique self-dual rule that coincides with CEA (E, e/2) 
on all problems with E < C/2. This rule is also independent of irrelevant claims, 
and therefore by Proposition 2 coincides with the CG principle on two-creditor 
problems. Rabbi Hai Gaon suggested that Rabbi Nathan's recommendations are 
related to the CG principle 13. Aumann and Maschler (1985) have shown that in 
any n-creditor problem their rule is the unique rule that assigns each two creditors 
i andj the awards (xl,x~) =  CG(xi +  xj, el, cj)). 
6.  Conclusion 
This  paper  provides  axiomatic  characterizations  of two  Talmudic  bankruptcy 
rules.  We believe that in addition to providing insight into these rules,  the results 
provide  support  for  the  idea  that  legal  problems  may  be  analyzed  by  game- 
theoretic tools, and especially by an axiomatic approach. 
In addition to the related work mentioned in the introduction and throughout 
the paper, we note that the rule described in Rashi's interpretation of Rabina was 
axiomatically treated  by O'Neill (1982). Dagan  and  Voly (1993,  Proposition  1) 
show that the CEA rule may be derived by applying the Nash bargaining solution 
to a bargaining problem associated with the bankruptcy problem. Dutta and Ray 
(1989, footnote 14) noted that applying their egalitarian solution to O'Neill's (1982) 
cooperative game associated with the bankruptcy problem will give the CEA rule. 
A concept that was extensively studied in relation to the bankruptcy problem is 
that of self-consistency (see, e.g., Young, 1987). We do not discuss this property in 
this paper although the CEA rule is self-consistent, because we are interested in 
presenting axioms that relate to Talmudic principles, and feel that self-consistency 
is not such a property. The properties in our characterizations compare between 
bankruptcy problems with the same set of creditors, and thus the results hold even 
when considering rules that are defined on a domain of problems with a fixed set of 
creditors, whereas self-consistency is a non-empty requirement only when consider- 
ing larger domains. 
13 We know about Hai Gaon's (939-1038) work from a quotation by Harif (Rabbi Yitshak 
Alfasi, 1013-1103). Gruner  (1974, pp.  15-16) lists about thirty quotations  of Hai Gaon's 
interpretation  of Ketuboth that indicate that such an interpretation  did exist. Old bankruptcy rules  59 
The axiom of independence of irrelevant claims admits another interpretation. 
The set of allocations in a bankruptcy problem is the same as in the problem where 
the claims  are  reduced to  the  relevant claims.  Thus independence of irrelevant 
claims requires that the rule should be a  function only of the set of allocations. 
Clearly, this interpretation was not inspired by Talmudic reasoning, but by modern 
game theory or bargaining theory. 
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